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ARTICLES
Flawed Justice: Limitation of Parental Remedies for
the Loss of Consortium of Adult Children
William S. Bailey*
I have often thought that if one of my children were to die,
I would collapse from the pain.'
Media sage Marshall McLuhan observed in 1967 that our society
is irretrievably mired in the past:
The past went that-a-way. When faced with a totally new situa-
tion, we tend always to attach ourselves to the objects, to the fla-
vor of the most recent past. We look at the present through a
rear-view mirror. We march backwards into the future.2
Both statutory and common law chronically lags behind contem-
porary social conditions. While this promotes a certain level of stabil-
ity in that unrest may result if the law is too far ahead of a comfortable
majority,3 this delay has the potential to unfairly disenfranchise others.
*B.S., University of Oregon, 1970 (with high honors); J.D., Northwestern University School of
Law, 1974. Instructor, Trial Advocacy Program, University of Washington School of Law.
This article is dedicated to Yianni Philippides (1977-2000). A curious, intelligent mind, a com-
passionate heart, and a peaceful spirit, whose untimely death prevented him from fulfilling his
dream of becoming the outstanding lawyer he surely would have been. The author gratefully
acknowledges the input of David M. Beninger, Esq, Seattle, Washington, in the initial common
law analysis.
1. John Dieden, Chicago, Illinois, May 12, 1866.
2. M. MCLUHAN & Q. FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE 74-75 (1967).
3. One of the best examples of unrest is the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which, viewed as ahead of its time by those who support it, has
engendered great controversy and a continuing backlash by the considerable body of Americans
who disagree with it.
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Justice is an abstract concept that can be difficult to achieve in
real life. As observed by the Arizona Supreme Court, human relation-
ships cannot be neatly boxed.4 The ultimate goal of our legal system
should be to study relationships with care, turning the knowledge
gained into sound rules of law. Under the best of circumstances,
"[t]he law does not fly in the face of nature, but rather acts in harmony
with it."'
Intelligently defining the common law is not only the right, but
also the obligation of the Judiciary.6 The common law should be dy-
namic, undergoing a regular re-examination of the soundness of its
precedents:
The nature of the common law requires that each time a rule of
law is applied, it be carefully scrutinized to make sure that the
conditions and needs of the times have not so changed as to
make further application of it the instrument of injustice....
Although the Legislature may of course speak to the subject, in
the common law system the primary instruments of the evolu-
tion are the courts, adjudicating on a regular basis the rich vari-
ety of individual cases brought before them.7
A "rear-view mirror" approach does just the opposite, blindly
following established precedent and wholly failing to question its ap-
plication in light of societal changes or the unique facts of a particular
case. Nowhere is the "rear-view mirror" orientation of the law more
pronounced than in its approach to the right of parents to recover loss
of consortium damages for serious injury to or the death of an adult
child. Despite a substantial body of research and legal commentary
over the last twenty-five years supporting an expansion of existing
remedies to encompass the loss of an adult child,8 the majority rule in
American jurisprudence remains that parents cannot bring such a
4. Frank. v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 722 P.2d 955 (Ariz. 1986).
5. Harper v. Tipple, 184 P. 1005, 1006 (Ariz. 1919) (quoting Lamar v. Harris, 44 S.E. 868
(Ga. 1903)).
6. Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 136, 691 P.2d 190, 193 (1984).
7. Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980) (quoting
Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974)).
8. See, e.g., Michael B. Victorson, Torts-Parent's Recovery for Loss of Society and Compan-
ionship of Child, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 340 (1978); Jean C. Love, Tortious Interference with the Par-
ent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590
(1976); Julian E. Hammar, Note, Breaking the Age Barrier in Alaska: Including Adult Children in
Loss of Filial Consortium Actions, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 73 (1995); Lanni P. Tama, Recovery for
Loss of Consortium in a Wrongful Death Action, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 605 (1983); Maureen Ann
Delaney, What About The Children? Toward an Expansion of Loss of Consortium Recovery in the
District Of Columbia, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 107 (1991).
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claim.' The majority rule of placing age limitations on common law
parental remedies is largely based on two factors: the centuries-old
view of children as property interests, 10 and Baker v. Bolton, an early
19th Century English case that has been criticized as fundamentally
unsound for decades."
Despite the intervening 130 years since the advent of child labor
laws and mandatory education in the late 19th Century, the majority
rule still adheres to the view of children as it was in Charles Dickens'
time. The changed character of the parent-child relationship in 21st
Century America has been studiously ignored. With an improved
standard of living and reduced infant mortality that became the norm
in America in the mid-20th Century, the view of children under the
age of majority has shifted to objects of adoration rather than objects
of economic value. This is particularly true after the Second World
War ended and the "baby boom" began,12 continuing on into the pre-
sent.
Given this shift, it is not surprising that an impressive body of
clinical research has developed over the last decade, demonstrating
just how complex and multifaceted the emotional ties of the parent-
child relationship are and how these ties continue to evolve and
deepen over a life span. 3 The loss of or serious injury to a child at any
age comes at an enormous emotional cost to parents, and social scien-
9. See, e.g., Estate of Wells v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 515 N.W. 2d 705, 710 (Wis. 1994)
(parents not allowed to recover for loss of consortium resulting from injuries sustained by an
adult child due to medical malpractice); Aurora v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 31 F.3d 724, 727 (8th
Cir. 1994) (finding the mother's loss of consortium claim arising out of non- fatal injury to adult
child was properly dismissed because Nebraska would not allow such claim); Counts v. Hospital-
ity Employees, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Iowa 1994) (finding a parent could not recover for
loss of consortium on account of dram shop injury to an adult son); Schmeck v. City of Shawnee,
647 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Kan. 1982) (denying parents of an adult child a consortium claim where
the State does not recognize loss of consortium claim for injuries caused by the negligence of an-
other); Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n v. Neal, 139 S.E. 841, 842 (N.C. 1927) (hold-
ing that parent of adult son who became deranged could not recover for loss of consortium be-
cause the damages were too remote); Cole v. Broomsticks, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ohio
1995), appeal denied, 663 N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio 1996), reconsideration denied, 665 N.E.2d 682
(Ohio 1996) (denying a parent of an adult child a loss of consortium action because no such cause
of action exists for a parent of an adult); Brower v. City of Philadelphia, 557 A.2d 48, 51 (Pa.
Commw. 1989) (denying parents claim for loss of adult child's filial consortium because Penn-
sylvania does not recognize cause of action for loss of companionship and society); Boucher v.
Dixie Med. Ctr., 850 P.2d 1179, 1184-85 (Utah 1992) (finding that parents of tortuously injured
adult child could not recover for loss of consortium in light of legislative abolition of spousal con-
sortium cause of action); Philippides v. Bernard, Nos. 73239-6, 73603-1, 73736-3, 74098-4, 2004
WL 855449 (Wash. Apr. 22, 2004).
10. See discussion infra pp. 945-948.
11. See discussion infra pp. 948-951.
12. See discussion infra pp. 953-954.
13. See discussion infra pp. 954-955.
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tists have learned precisely how profound this nightmare is.14 The
rear-view mirror approach of the common law presumes a difference
to these parents based on the age of the child that does not exist. It
has now been conclusively shown that all such unfortunate parents go
through a process of profound mental distress, grief, and depression
for the rest of their lives."
A new twist in the traditional economic loss analysis has also
emerged, based on recent studies of caregiving by adult children to
their aging parents. Due to an increased standard of living and more
sophisticated medical care, Americans are living longer than ever. 6
When any child is killed, adult or minor, parents suffer a very real
economic loss of a caretaker in their later years of physical infirmity. 7
Contrary to popular belief, adult children, not the government, pro-
vide a substantial amount of the care required by their infirm par-
ents.'" The loss of an adult child reduces the care options of such par-
ents. As a result, the parents will likely have to purchase services that
otherwise would have been provided by their wrongfully injured or
killed adult child. Eliminating such caregivers for infirm parents who
otherwise cannot afford to pay for them has the potential to shift a
very real economic burden onto the taxpayers.
This article presents the inherent contradiction between a parent-
child relationship that has steadily evolved from the early 20th Cen-
tury to the present and the multitude of court decisions on damages
that remain studiously ignorant of this shift. Part I of the article will
set forth the common law origins of restrictions on recovery for
wrongful death within the context of a shifting view of children from
economic units to objects of adoration. Part II will examine the devas-
tating impact that the loss of an adult child has on parents both from
their perspectives and from now existing research. In the context of
this body of evidence, and society's changed view of children, Part III
will examine the inadequate development of wrongful death law since
its common law origins. While a few forward thinking state supreme
courts have taken a realistic look at this archaic and wrongful denial of
14. See discussion infra pp. 960-963.
15. See discussion infra pp. 960-963.
16. See infra Table A.
17. See discussion infra pp. 965-967
18. See, e.g., Sheel M. Pandya & Barbara Coleman, Caregiving and Long-Term Care, at
http://research.aarp.org/health/fs82_caregiving.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2004); GREGORY C.
SMITH ET AL., STRENGTHENING AGING FAMILIES: DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE AND POLICY 3-4
(1995); Family Caregiver Alliance, Fact Sheet: Selected Caregiver Statistics, at
http://www.caregiver.org/caregiver/sp/content-node.jsp?nodeid=439 (last visited May 6,
2004).
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loss of consortium damages to parents for their adult children, 9 these
cases are beacons of rationality in a stare decisis wasteland. Only these
few courts have seen all too clearly that the emperor of Baker v. Bolton
has no clothes. Ultimately, the denial of any common law remedy for
the parental loss of consortium of adult children is based on neither a
correct reading of the law, nor on sound social policy. The unthinking
embrace of Baker v. Bolton must, at long last, yield to the realities of
the modern parent-child relationship in fashioning fair and just reme-
dies for loss of consortium.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The common law view of children only in terms of their eco-
nomic contributions to the family has endured for centuries, based on
a way of life radically different from the present. In Leviathan, Tho-
mas Hobbes wrote that 17th Century life was "solitary, poor[], nasty,
brutish, and short."20 This was especially true for children because
most families made their living in agricultural pursuits, forcing them
to put their children to work as soon as possible as a matter of eco-
nomic necessity. Their only value was seen in what services they
could perform for their parents and, consequently, the social values of
that distant time only reflected concern for purely pecuniary losses.
The common law protected property rights, but there was no recogni-
tion of any modern right to recovery for the loss of intangibles, such as
love, companionship, or family ties.2' A master had a cause of action
when his servant's services were lost due to the negligence of a third
19. Frank, 722 P.2d 955, 961 (Ariz. 1986) (recognizing on a common law basis that the
parents of an adult child could bring a loss of consortium action against a physician, alleging that
negligent administration of anesthesia during surgery had caused severe brain damage); Green v.
Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 220 (N.J. 1980) (reversing a jury verdict awarding no damages to the par-
ents for the death of a high school senior who was killed in an automobile accident. Though the
court was constrained by legislative enactments in New Jersey from applying its reasoning for
loss of consortium damages for the death of adult children, the opinion contains a penetrating
analysis of the absurdity and inappropriateness of such limitations looking for the first time at
the consequences of the loss of adult children to aging and infirm parents.). But see, Tynan v.
Curzi, 753 A.2d 187, 191 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2000) (ruling that most of the Bittner opinion
was dicta, and that New Jersey common law still does not permit a parental loss of consortium
action for the wrongful death of an adult child.); Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566,
577-78 (Haw. 1989) (relying on Frank to allow the parents of an adult child who was severely
injured by an alleged automobile product defect to bring a loss of consortium claim. It should be
noted that Frank and Masaki did not involve wrongful death, but rather severe injury to an adult
child. In Bittner, the decedent was still living at home with her parents at the time of her death).
20. THOMAS HoBBES, LEVIATHAN 97(7th ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (1651).
21. See generally Frank, 722 P.2d at 959.
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12party. This cause of action later extended to husbands for the loss of
services of a wife due to a tortfeasor's negligence.2 1
The economic value of children shifted in the industrial revolu-
tion of the 18th Century, both in the United States and Europe, when
many were removed from farms to an urban life as wage earners in
mills and factories.24 Many of the first factory hands were women and
children. When Samuel Slater opened his first mill in Pawtucket,
Rhode Island in 1790, his work force consisted of seven boys and two
girls, aged seven to eleven. 25
The miserable plight of such factory children in the
19th Century was most effectively publicized by Charles Dickens, not
only one of the greatest authors of all time, but a relentless social re-
former. 26  When Dickens was given a report of the Children's Em-
ployment Commission by Dr. Southwood Smith, he learned of the
hideous conditions to which even small children were subjected-e.g.,
22. As Dean Prosser has set forth, the roots of this go back to early Roman law, where the
head of the household could bring an action to redress violence by another against any family
member, his slaves or employees. The close degree of relationship was thought to justify this
entitlement. This principle was adopted into English common law in an altered form by the
thirteenth century, becoming "an action for damages sustained by any master through actual loss
of the services of a servant because of violence inflicted upon him, including the members of the
master's family." This was later expanded upon by statute in 1349, when an action was given to
an employer for enticing or harboring a servant. WILLIAM L. PROSSER & JOHN W. WADE,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1008 (5th ed. 1971).
23. Gregg A. Guthrie, Note, Should Pennsylvania Recognize a Cause of Action for Loss of
Parental Consortium? 28 DUQ. L. REV. 697, 698 (1990); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125 (5th ed. 1984).
24. Pre-Civil War farm life in the Northern United States was demanding and relied on the
labor of every family member, including children over the age of six. Typically, farm families
were large because of the many tasks necessary to operate a farm. Children of both genders did a
series of well-defined tasks such as feeding livestock, gathering eggs, milking, gardening and fill-
ing wood boxes. After puberty, boys joined their fathers in the fields and girls helped their
mothers in the house. PAULINE MAIER ET AL., INVENTING AMERICA 375 (2003). The rapid
urbanization in the last two decades of the nineteenth century was the beginning of an exodus
from farming that would change the family dynamic in striking ways. Cities grew much faster
than the nation as a whole, with a third of our population classified as urban by the end of the
nineteenth century. JOHN M. BLUM ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 442 (1963). The
United States had become an industrial power by 1900, with manufacturing, construction and
mining accounting for two-thirds of the economy. MAIER ET AL., supra, at 567. Children were
needed to fill some of these newly created industrial jobs and precarious economics of many
families required that they do so. A slogan of the time demonstrated the overall acceptance of
this fact: "The factories need the children and the children need the factories." TIME-LIFE
BOOKS, THIS FABULOUS CENTURY, PRELUDE, 1870-1900, 124 (1970). Even after child labor
laws were passed in the early twentieth century in Massachusetts to prohibit the employment of
children under fourteen, in 1912, half of the children of Lawrence, Massachusetts between the
age of fourteen and eighteen worked in mills. THOMAS R. BROOKS, TOIL AND TROUBLE: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 118 (2d ed. 1971).
25. BROOKS, supra note 24, at 17.
26. One of the acknowledged definitive biographies of Dickens is EDGAR JOHNSON,
CHARLES DICKENS: HIS TRAGEDY & TRIUMPH (rev. ed. 1977).
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seven-year-olds chained to loaded carts in dark tunnels, girls in ragged
trousers working in the dark, often up to their knees in water, carrying
heavy loads of coal, and deformed boys working fourteen hours a day
in steel mills, struck with bars and burned by showers of sparks.27
The fate of American children in the 19th Century was scarcely better
than their English counterparts. The miseries of immigrant life in ur-
ban centers such as New York and Chicago have also been well docu-
mented.28
The predominant social philosophy in the upper classes through
the 19th Century was laissez faire capitalism. 9 The ruthless greed
that caused children to be subjected to these oppressive conditions was
justified by the notion that anything necessary to produce profitable
trade was allowable. Under the prevailing economic theories of supply
and demand, a businessman was entitled to buy in the cheapest mar-
27. Id. at 184-85; Professor Malone has one of the most succinct descriptions of how the
industrialized 19thCentury forever changed the nature of wrongful death actions for victims of
all ages:
[T]he story of the Death Action... is a novel of the nineteenth century, a story of
the new swarming into crowded cities, the travail of the factory and, above all, of the
first hurtling of men and goods across the continent on steel rails. Up until this time
unnatural death meant largely death by violence in the popular sense of the word. It
was the work of the robber, the burglar, or the hot-blooded man. Usually the culprit
was executed or confined behind bars. Even if he were left free in society he was usu-
ally without any means to compensate the bereaved family of the victim. In this set-
ting, wrongful death was a matter of little concern to the civil law, and lawmen devel-
oped no tools for the handling of it. Then, suddenly at mid-century society faced up
in panic to a virtually new phenomenon-accidental death through corporate enter-
prise. Tragedy as a result of indifference and neglect was suddenly upon us in the fac-
tory, on the city streets, and on the rails. Nor was the principal villain of the piece any
longer the impecunious felon. In his place stood the prospering corporation with
abundant assets to meet the needs of widows and orphans.
It is obvious that law was destined to respond to this violent shift in the human
equation-but through which agency and by what means was the change to take
place?
Wex S. Malone, The Genesis Of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043 (1965).
28. MAIER ET AL., supra note 24, at 611. Children of immigrants were put to work for
long hours and low wages. Their parents were often both out of the house trying to earn enough
money to pay for food and shelter.
29. In his widely influential book, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS: WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION (1868), Professor Thomas M. Cooley of the University of Michigan pro-
vided the foundation for turning the newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution into a sweeping legal mandate for the American business community to do exactly
as it pleased, without governmental influence or regulation. Later on, laissez faire capitalism
would have no more ardent spokesman than George F. Baer, president of the Reading Railroad.
During the drawn-out, bitter anthracite coal mining strike of 1902, Baer attempted to elevate this
philosophy to a divine mandate: "The rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected
and cared for-not by labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in his infinite wis-
dom has given the control of the property interests of the country." BLUM ET AL., supra note 24,
at 525.
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ket and sell in the best. In turn, the courts valued children only in
terms of the meager wages they could earn in this predatory climate.30
However, as America became more prosperous through the latter
decades of the 19th Century, both social conditions and perspectives
on the proper role of children began to change. The abuses of child
labor were made manifest by reformers as the excesses of laissez faire
capitalism came under increasing attack.3' After 1870, states began
passing laws making school attendance mandatory. 2 In the early 20th
Century, child labor was finally regulated and steadily declined as a
force in the marketplace.3 Family life and children steadily became
more of a matter of quality than quantity. Particularly among Ameri-
30. Perhaps the most articulate discussion and passionate condemnation of the common
law's prior regard for children as mere economic units came in the Michigan Supreme Court de-
cision of Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118 (Mich. 1960). See discussion infra pp. 968-969.
The court discussed several of the early English decisions limiting recovery of a child's wrongful
death to pecuniary losses. The court recognized that these past decisions reflected the dimin-
ished social conditions which produced them, where debtor's prisons, public floggings and the
virtual slavery of apprenticeships were standard practices: "Loss meant only money loss, and
money loss from the death of a child meant only his lost wages. All else was imaginary. The
only reality was the King's shilling." Id. at 121. However, the court recoiled from any notion
that this body of law, formulated during "one of the darkest chapters in the history of child-
hood," should continue in force: "That this barbarous concept of the pecuniary loss to a parent
from the death of his child should control our decisions today is a reproach to justice .... We are
aware, of course, that there are those who say that the life of human being is impossible to value,
that although we will grapple mightily with the value of the life of a horse, of a team of mules, we
will stand aloof where a human is concerned and assign it no value whatever. This kind of deli-
cacy would prevent the distribution of food to the starving because the sight of hunger is so sick-
ening .... " Id. at 122. The court concluded with the realization that it was dealing with a fic-
tion "[that] ... the minor child [in today's society] is a breadwinner. He is not. He is an
expense." Id. at 123.
31. There was a strong current of opinion in America that condemned the entire factory
system, no matter what the age of its employees.
[M[any considered the factory system both alien to and destruction of American ide-
als and standards.... This was a widely shared belief among independent artisans,
Jeffersonian farmers and New England transcendentalists. Henry David Thoreau,
mulling over his thoughts on the lonely shores of Walden Pond in 1845, wasn't the
only one to ask, "Where is this division of labor to end?"
BROOKS, supra note 24, at 29.
The progressive movement, which swept the country in the early twentieth century, was suc-
cessful in limiting child labor, particularly with northern state legislatures. The evils of the eco-
nomic exploitation of children was argued convincingly with statistics from 1900 that showed
one out of every six children between the ages of ten and fifteen working full time (much higher
than this average in some southern states). Congress joined the move to ban child labor with the
Keating-Owen Act, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675 (1916), which prohibited the interstate shipment of cer-
tain manufactured goods. This was later declared unconstitutional in 1918 by the United States
Supreme Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) overruled by U.S. v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941), on the grounds that it went beyond the federal government's power to regulate
interstate commerce. See MAIER ET AL., supra note 24, at 700.
32. MAIER ET AL., supra note 24, at 619.
33. Id. at 700.
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cans of Caucasian ancestry, a steady decline in the birth rate was noted
from 1800 to 1900. 3' This decline corresponded with a decrease in in-
fant mortality.3" These changes were the first evidence of a funda-
mental shift-children valued more for their companionship than as
contributors to the family finances.
A. History of the Denial of Recovery for Wrongful Death-Blind
Imitation of Lord Ellenborough's Wrong Turn
How did we go so far, for so long, down this road of denying
damages to parents whose adult children were killed or seriously in-
jured? The answer requires going back centuries to look at the ebb
and flow of English common law. The unsupported, clearly erroneous
early 19th Century decision of Baker v. Bolton wiped out all actions for
wrongful death in one fell swoop.36 In a very real sense, the toll taken
by Baker continues on to this day, largely unexamined by the Ameri-
can courts that adopted it simply because of blind obedience to prece-
dent.
The early history of wrongful death actions in England did not
discriminate based on the age of the victim.37 English courts recog-
nized the accidental killing of a human being as compensable even be-
fore the time of the Norman Conquest in 1066.38 An assortment of
legal theories were available to wrongful death claimants throughout
the Middle Ages, including the "wer," the "wite," and the "appeal of
murdrum. '' 39 Ancient English common law accepted the fundamental
right of a decedent's family to obtain compensation for this loss.4"
A significant early limitation of these existing remedies for
wrongful death in the early English legal system occurred when the
"felony-merger" doctrine was adopted.4 A civil tort against a private
person was determined to be less important than a criminal offense
against the Crown.42 Accordingly, a criminal action preempted a pri-
vate suit for damages arising from an act that constituted a crime.43
34. Id. at 618.
35. Dramatic improvements were seen in infant mortality in America by the 1920s, with a
rate about half what it had been in 1900. Id. at 741.
36. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808).
37. Malone, supra note 27, at 1055 n.61 (noting that damages had been allowed to a spouse,
parent or child).
38. 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 18-22 (5th ed. 1956).
39. Malone, supra note 27, at 1055.
40. Id.
41. Smith v. Sykes, 89 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1677); Higgins v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61
(K.B. 1607).
42. See generally Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 382 (1970).
43. 1d.
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Under the felony-merger doctrine in death cases, felons were not only
executed, but also forfeited their property to the Crown. In such cir-
cumstances, civil wrongful death actions were not filed, not because
there was no common right to do so, but because the Crown had con-
fiscated all assets of the wrongdoer. 4 While this analysis did not turn
on the age of the victim, it established far-reaching precedent to limit
actions for loss of consortium.
The limitations imposed by the felony merger rule paled in com-
parison to what was to follow in the now infamous early 19 th Century
decision of Baker v. Bolton.4" The severely limited present-day reme-
dies available to parents in the United States for the loss of consortium
of their adult children is at least partly attributable to this unfortunate
but enduring precedent. In Baker, a husband brought an action for
wrongful death when his wife was killed after a stagecoach overturned.
The trial judge, Lord Ellenborough, instructed the jury that the dam-
ages were limited to the plaintiff-husband's loss of society and the
grief he suffered from the date of the accident to the time of the death,
which was about one month.46 Though there was no claim before the
court for the death itself, the jury was instructed that "in civil court,
the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury. ' ' 7
Though Lord Ellenborough offered no citation to support his
position, his assertion erroneously became the basis for many later
American cases holding that there could be no recovery for wrongful
death in the absence of a statute.48 While the "felony-merger" doc-
trine was later added as further justification, this made no sense as the
doctrine had never been adopted as a part of the common law tradition
in the United States. 49  Further, there were no colonial decisions or
statutes that supported the idea that a wrongful death claim would
have been denied by the colonial courts."0 In fact, numerous 19th cen-
tury U.S. decisions explicitly permitted common law wrongful death
actions. 1
44. Id.
45. 1 Camp. 493,170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808).
46. Dean Prosser wryly describes Lord Ellenborough as "not the English judge most dis-
tinguished by a reputation for common sense." PROSSER & WADE, supra note 22, at 1088.
47. Malone, supra note 27, at 1058.
48. See generally LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066 (2001).
49. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 382; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
680-83 (1974).
50. Malone, supra note 27, at 1065-66.
51. Cross v. Guthrey, 2 Root 90, 92 (Conn. 1794); Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1838); James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162, 163-64 (1853); Kake v. Horton, 2 Haw. 209, 212-
13 (1860); Sullivan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 23 F. Cas. 368, 371 (Cir. Ct. Neb. 1874); See also 1
Records of the Court of Assistants of the Massachusetts Bay 54-55 (1675) (finding a civil defen-
[Vol. 27:941
2004] Remedies for Loss of Consortium of Adult Children 951
No decision better illustrates the propensity of the judiciary for
blind adherence to precedent, no matter how unwise, than Baker.
Dean Prosser observed that as a result of Baker, "it was cheaper for the
defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him. '52 William Holds-
worth described Lord Ellenborough's statement as not only "obvi-
ously unjust" but also inaccurate and "technically unsound.. . based
upon a misreading of legal history." 53 But notwithstanding, Baker be-
came the predominant rear-view mirror image of the common law for
wrongful death cases, taking a meat axe approach to the entire cause of
action.
Lord Ellenborough's dictum in Baker did not have the staying
power in England that it did in the United States. It was overturned
thirty-eight years later when Lord Campbell's Act was adopted in
1846, creating a statutory action for wrongful death. 4 The preamble
contained a parliamentary declaration of what the English common
law rule was at the time, creating a civil cause of action for deaths that
had been caused under circumstances that would amount to a felony
under the criminal laws. The same capacity for mimicry that led to
the American adoption of Baker did not extend to this correction.
The harsh result of Baker continued to be applied in the United States
without question. The best proof of the force of McLuhan's rear-view
mirror perspective in the common law is that it took 162 years in the
United States before Lord Ellenborough's blunder in Baker v. Bolton
was first exposed in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. 5
Writing for the majority of the United States Supreme Court in
Moragne, Justice Harlan peeled away geologic layers of judicial igno-
rance, exposing the underlying unsoundness of Baker. His opinion
overruled precedent that had prevented a widow from recovering
damages for the death of her husband in a maritime setting. 6 After
analyzing the long history of the common law right to a remedy for
wrongful death in both England and pre-colony America, Justice
Harlan found absolutely no justification for the denial of a remedy for
wrongful death:
Where the existing law imposes a primary duty, violations of
which are compensable if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary
notions of justice suggest that a violation shall be non-actionable
dant liable for having "accidentally discharg[ed] gun[s] at foules on ye neck thereby wounding
Samuel [F]Iack[']s son so as he d[i]ed");
52. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 127.
53. 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 336 (5th ed. 1956).
54. Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
55. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
56. Id.
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simply because it was serious enough to cause death. On the
contrary, that rule has been criticized ever since its inception and
described in such terms as "barbarous."57
Justice Harlan noted a fundamental difference between actions
for injury and those for wrongful deaths. In the case of mere injury,
the person physically harmed is made whole for his harm, while in the
case of death, those closest to him-usually spouse and children-seek
to recover for their total loss of one on whom they depended. If the
law refused to allow actions for wrongful death, Justice Harlan ex-
pected "to find a persuasive, independent justification for this appar-
ent legal anomaly."58 Yet, the only possible basis for this rule was the
inapplicable felony-merger doctrine.
After surveying the misguided and unthinking past use of Baker
v. Bolton, Justice Harlan concluded "[T]he courts failed to produce
any satisfactory justification for applying the rule in this country."59
Justice Harlan added that "[t]he most likely reason that the English
Rule was adopted in this country without much question is simply
that it had the blessing of age .... "60 In so many words, the Moragne
opinion concluded that Baker was a flagrant example of what McLu-
han would call "marching backwards into the future," a decision per-
petuated just because it had existed for so long. The Moragne court
found the blind, long-lived adherence to Baker to be fundamentally
inconsistent with the philosophy of American jurisprudence.
"[O]ur ancestors brought with them [the] general principles [of
the common law] and claimed it as their birthright; ... they
brought with them and adopted only that portion which was ap-
plicable to *their situation." The American courts never made
the inquiry whether this particular English Rule, bitterly criti-
cized in England "was applicable to their situation," and it is
difficult to imagine on what basis they might have concluded
that it was.6'
Remarkably, most state courts have yet to follow the United
States Supreme Court's lead in Moragne. Common law entitlement to
wrongful death actions of all types has continued to languish. And the
spirit of Baker still hovers in the background as a barrier to parental
actions for the loss of consortium of their adult children.
57. Id. at 381. See also Osborn v. Gilliett, L.R. 8 Ex. 88, 94 (1873) (Lord Bramwell, dis-
senting); FREDRICK POLLOCK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 74-75 (1894); 3
WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, supra note 53, at 676-77.
58. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 382.
59. Id. at 385.
60. Id. at 386.
6 1. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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While Massachusetts promptly followed Moragne and eliminated
obedience to Baker in its common law in 1972,62 other states have been
slower to do so. 63 New Jersey is one of the more recent states to rec-
ognize the same error of barring damages for wrongful death based on
Baker. In LaFage v. Jani,64 the New Jersey Supreme Court conducted
a thorough review of the history of such claims, concluding that its
Wrongful Death Act was a codification of the common law, thus mak-
ing the Act's statute of limitations procedural and subject to equitable
principles. In so doing, the Court explained why it was necessary to
overrule many of its prior decisions:
Because our earlier judicial conclusion that New Jersey did not
have a wrongful death cause of action at common law found its
way into our law through misconception, because that approach
operates harshly when equitable principles are not applied to
ameliorate its harshness to conform with modern concepts of
justice and fairness and because the underpinning for the Eng-
lish rule that was followed in New Jersey for so long has been
condemned, the time has come for its elimination. Simply
stated, there was historical error of grave proportion. In overrul-
ing prior precedent, we are discharging our "vital responsibility
of re-examining questioned decisions whether they be [our] own
or those of [our] predecessors."..... Respect for the process of
adjudication should be enhanced, not diminished by such a rul-
ing today ... because we are clarifying rather than unsettling
our common law.65
Coming nearly thirty years after Moragne, decisions like LaFage
show just how difficult it is to eliminate centuries of misguided, blind
62. See Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1972) (where the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that "[T]he law in this Commonwealth has also evolved to the point
where it may now be held that the right to recover for wrongful death is of common law origin,
and we so hold.... Consequently, our wrongful death statutes will no longer be regarded as 'cre-
ating the right' to recover for wrongful death."). See also LaFage, 766 A.2d 1066, 1076-77 (N.J.
2001); Summerfield v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 698 P.2d 712, 716 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that a com-
mon law wrongful death claim is not necessarily precluded by Arizona's wrongful death statutes
in light of the doubtful validity of Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius
1808)); Haakanson v. Wakefield Seafoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Alaska 1979) (finding that
Alaska's wrongful death statute is not in derogation of its common law, but stating that if there
were no statute, the court would follow the lead of Moragne); Wilbon v. D. F. Bast Co., Inc., 382
N.E.2d 784, 785 (Ill. 1987) ([the] Baker v. Bolton rule was "obviously unjust... technically un-
sound... and based upon a misreading of legal history.").
63. See the extended analysis by the court in LaFage, 766 A.2d at 1076-80. See also Tait v.
Wahl, 97 Wash. App. 765, 771, 987 P.2d 127, 130 (1999) (where the Court concluded without
analysis that "[i]t is settled beyond controversy that, at common law, no civil action could be
maintained for damages resulting from the death of a human being.").
64. 766 A.2d 1066 (N.J. 2001).
65. Id. at 1080 (citations omitted).
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judicial adherence. Since the stare decisis perspective of the judicial
system is not equipped to detect such mistakes of the past, the com-
mon law is often doomed to repeat them.
B. The Shifting View of Children from Economic Units
to Objects of Adoration
The grave error of continuing to embrace Baker v. Bolton in pre-
sent day America becomes even more manifest as the perceived bene-
fit of children strongly has shifted to emotional and psychological sup-
port. This is particularly true with the improvements in family life
and child welfare after World War II. During the Great Depression
of the 1930s, marriages and births in America declined, reflecting the
hard economic conditions of that time.66 However, after the Second
World War, America's unprecedented prosperity led to the greatest,
most sustained number of new children ever seen:
The [economic] boom of 1945 to 1973, occasionally interrupted
by recessions only to roll on seemingly undiminished, was the
longest in American history. ... The flush of prosperity and the
thrill of victory also translated into a baby boom. The number
of births jumped by nineteen percent from 1945 to 1946, then
another twelve percent the next year, and after settling down for
three years boomed again and continued to boom into the early
Sixties. More babies were born in 1948-53 than in the previous
thirty years .... Couples were marrying earlier, starting their
children earlier, and having more of them. The baby boom was
widely touted as a tribute to the national glory.67
The post-war affluence in America provided not only more con-
sumer luxuries, but also more leisure time for the family to develop
social relationships:
[T]he family was the raison d'etre of affluence, its point and its
locale.... [T]he family unit: Mom, who would spend the bulk
of her life supervising her conveniences, and the kids, who
would grow up knowing how good the things of life could
be.... [T]he nuclear family was bound together through the
cementing idea of "togetherness".68
There is no question that the relationship of children to their
parents underwent a fundamental shift during the baby boom years,
one that continues to this day. How can the centuries old common
66. MAIER ET AL., supra note 24, at 782; BLUM ET AL., supra note 24, at 688.
67. TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE 12-13 (1987).
68. Id. at 15.
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law view of children as mere economic units be justified in this pre-
vailing social climate?
Research on the modern parent-child relationship shows just
how far we have moved since the time of Dickens. In any culture the
love of their children is a lifelong emotional anchor point for parents.69
Perhaps because the closeness of the parent-child relationship had
been deemed to be self-evident, the social sciences were slow to study
it.7" While romantic attachments and social friendships may be transi-
tory, the parent-child bond is remarkably durable, lasting a lifetime.71
Such ties now are understood to be critical to stability, good mental
health and the enjoyment of life.72 In fact, for adult children, the evi-
dence suggests that a healthy, strong parental bond is as critical in the
sense of well being as a life's partner or a best friend.73
The relationship of parents and children is far from static. Re-
search now demonstrates that this relationship undergoes a continual
metamorphosis throughout the life of both parent and child." Like
fine wine, there is an unmistakable and steady improvement in the
parent-child relationship as offspring and their parents age.7" Even in
relationships characterized by volatility in the teenage years, people
generally report increasing closeness with their parents as they increase
in age."
This growing body of research on how parents and children re-
late has yet to find its way into any reported cases involving the inju-
ries or death of children, whether minor or adult. It seems that the
common law has taken an almost purposeful stand to remain ignorant
on this subject, which makes it easier to understand how the ghost of
Baker has endured so long. It must be questioned how the common
law can intelligently assess the value of the parent-child bond on the
basis of mere assumptions and conventional wisdom when there is
now such a rich and growing body of research on this central facet of
human existence. It points at a general isolation of the law from other
69. See, e.g., Frits van Wel et al., Changes in the Parental Bond and the Well-Being of Ado-
lescents And Young Adults, 37 ADOLESCENCE 317, 317 (2002).
70. See, e.g., Tamara D. Golish, Changes in Closeness Between Adult Children and Their Par-
ents: A Turning Point Analysis, 13 COMMUNICATION REPORTS 79, 79 (2000).
71. Id.
72. See K. Floyd & M. R. Parks, Manifesting Closeness in the Interactions of Peers: A Look at
Siblings and Friends, 8 COMMUNICATION REPORTS 69, 69 (1995).
73. See van Wel, supra note 69.
74. See Golish, supra note 70.
75. ALICE S. ROSSI & PETER H. ROSSI, OF HUMAN BONDING: PARENT-CHILD
RELATIONS ACROSS THE LIFE COURSE 276-81 (1990).
76. Id.
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fields of learning, which severely hampers the ability of any court to
intelligently assess the value of the parent-child relationship.
II. THE DEVASTATING IMPACT OF THE Loss OF A CHILD
A. How Parents and Family View Civil Actions for the
Wrongful Death of Adult Children
What importance does a wrongful death action have for parents
who have lost an adult child? There is a notable absence of any quali-
tative discussion in the legal literature of the emotional needs that
bring surviving parents and family to file such civil actions in the first
place. Any purely linear analysis of a legal process, ignoring the emo-
tional needs of those who use it, falls far short. In the public arena,
the insurance industry fills this void for tort actions by recounting a
parade of economic horribles, suggesting that families seek to cash in
on tragedy, increasing the cost of insurance in so doing. Is this profit-
motivated commentary inaccurate? Is it the money or something more
that these victims seek? If so, what?
Whether or not the legal literature recognizes and reports it,
wrongful death and any subsequent civil action to remedy it puts
families through a wrenching trauma nearly equivalent to the pain of
the underlying loss. Far from an armchair spectator sport, litigation
makes emotional demands on anyone who participates, creating a cer-
tain reluctance of victims to file a civil action. There is rarely any mo-
tivation of trying to "cash in" by victims, but rather a deeply felt need
for accountability.77
Parents usually file civil actions for the death of their children,
whether minor or adult, because it is "the right thing to do,"7 not for
the money. They often believe that the decedent would want them to
seek justice and are motivated to prevent the same type of negligencefrom harming others in the future. 79 For reasons that will be discussed
later, often the only possible way they are given to accomplish this ac-
countability is through filing a civil action.
One of the national statistics that favors allowing parental actions
for the loss of consortium of adult children for enhanced accountabil-
77. This is based on the author's three decades of experience as a plaintiffs trial lawyer,
handling many wrongful death and serious injury cases. Of necessity, representing clients under
these circumstances leads to a relationship in some ways similar to a therapist - the most deeply
held feelings of clients are routinely discussed.
78. E-mail from Shirley A. Murphy, Ph.D., University of Washington, to William Bailey
(May 28, 2003) (on file with author). Dr. Murphy conferred with Charles R. Figley, Ph.D., of
the University of Washington prior to transmitting her opinions.
79. Id.
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ity is that the rate of violent death of young people is a serious social
problem, now bordering on epidemic. Tens of thousands of young
Americans between twelve and twenty-eight die each year because of
accident, homicide or suicide,8" accounting for over eighty percent of
the violent deaths of young people. Motor vehicle accidents amount
to nearly fifty percent of the total.81 The criminal justice system,
overwhelmed as it is, often does not take the strong action against the
wrongdoers that victims' families need to heal and go on with their
lives.
The deterrence function of such civil actions for loss of consor-
tium is best illustrated by motor vehicle and motor vehicle/pedestrian
collisions, which are a major source of wrongful deaths in America.82
Invariably, there is an investigation in the criminal justice system that
often ends in no more than a traffic ticket to the defendant driver. 83
Most prosecuting attorneys have a set of guidelines that require ex-
treme speed, gross negligence or proof of substance abuse to justify
bringing a felony charge against the defendant driver. 4 As time goes
on and the authorities do little, parents and family invariably lower
their expectations about any possible accountability through a vehicu-
lar homicide criminal case.8"
The parents caught in this situation want and need accountabil-
ity from the wrongdoer. They are able to do this by filing a civil ac-
tion and having their "day in court." Undeniably, a sense of betrayal
that the tortfeasor suffered no real consequences in the criminal justice
system never really goes away, even after a successful outcome in a
civil action. There is a deep and abiding sense among the decedent's
family that the only true justice could have been obtained through a
criminal prosecution:
80. U.S. National Center for Health Statistics reported that in 1992, over 40,000 young
Americans between 12 and 28 died from these three causes. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, DEATHS: LEADING CAUSES FOR 2001, NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REPORT
Vol. 52, No. 9, at 13 tbl. 1 (Nov. 7, 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/
nvsr52/nvsr52_09.pdf (last visited May 19, 2004).
81. Id.
82. Frederick P. Rivara, M.D., of the Injury Prevention Center at the University of Wash-
ington's Harborview Medical Center in Seattle, Washington reports that 5,870 pedestrians were
killed in the United States in 2000. More than one-third of these were children and young
adults. Email from Fredrick P. Rivara to William Bailey (May 27, 2003) (on file with author).
83. Email from Amy Freidheim, J.D., King County, Washington Deputy Prosecuting At-
torney in charge of pedestrian/motor vehicle accidents, and Daniel T. Satterberg, J.D., Chief
Deputy, King County, Washington, Prosecuting Attorneys Office to William Bailey (Aug. 22,
2003) (on file with author).
84. Id.
85. See supra note 78.
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Why would a person who killed someone through gross negli-
gence not be held accountable in the criminal system just be-
cause they were not under the influence? ... I have a lot of ani-
mosity for [the prosecuting attorney] ... I hold [the prosecuting
attorney] personally responsible .... It's a one-sided system,
the victims don't matter .... The criminal justice system gave
up on [our son]] .... Society and the legal system have the re-
sponsibility to hold guilty parties accountable, especially for a
death ... 86
Yet, the civil justice system clearly is seen as better than nothing
by aggrieved parents and family members, even though the narrow fo-
cus of economic damages is not nearly as satisfying as the prospect of
criminal sanctions:
Money is not the issue .... No amount of money will bring the
person back, but that is the only justice available in the sys-
tem.... How can pay stubs and tax returns tell anyone what
kind of person they are evaluating? That is the most insulting,
degrading and emotionally upsetting process to have to go
through. There is no compassion, there is no humanity in-
volved .... [We] did not "get" anything. All that the civil sys-
tem can concretely offer is money and what is that compared to a
life? Nothing. I do not feel as if we have won or gained any-
thing. We simply prevented further injustice."
The most significant cost to parents in filing a civil action for the
wrongful death of a child is that it forces them to relive the horror of
what happened:
My nightmares turned from fuzzy images of what might have
been to concrete ones, seared on my mind. Before, I did not
know what the vehicle looked like, how [our son's] body must
have flown through the air, what [the defendant] looked like and
everything else that came out in the court proceeding. ...
Courts remind us of our loss, with delays and technical post-
ponements. It keeps the tragic event fresh in our minds, instead
of being able to put it to rest. Although you are seeking justice,
you feel guilty and it aggravates your pain for the great loss. ...
Being in court every day so close to the man that killed [our son]
was horrible. It was a constant battle to stay composed and to
not yell obscenities or throw punches .... 88
86. Emails from a client of William Bailey to William Bailey (May-July 2003) (redacted
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An apology by a wrongdoer can have a healing effect on the vic-
tim's family. Yet, even in the most extreme cases of negligence, ad-
missions of wrongdoing and apologies are rare in modern day Amer-
ica. Parents and family feel as if their loved one was stolen from their
midst by a defendant that seemingly goes on with life with few conse-
quences. This lack of an apology is deeply troubling to the decedent's
family:
Would I have liked to faced [the defendant]? Yes, I would have.
I would like to know what happened to him after the case was
over, but I don't. People ask if he is still driving, I don't know.
People ask if he felt remorse, I don't know. People ask if he was
fired, I don't know. I was never able to face him and the only
real punishment he got was a traffic fine. He got off easy. I
cannot feel compassion for what he might be going through be-
cause he was never punished. To me, he got away with murder
- he took a lethal weapon, a motor vehicle, and through his neg-
ligence, killed someone .... Society and the legal system have
the responsibility to hold guilty parties accountable, especially
for a death ... I wish that [the defendant] would have been re-
quired to face the jury when they announced that he alone was
responsible. But he didn't even have to be in the courtroom,
only his lawyer was there.8 9
In criminal matters, victims are able to address the perpetrator at
sentencing, telling him on a one-to-one basis just how devastating his
actions were. In a civil action, parents and family find healing in the
prospect of being vindicated by a civil jury, with a public pronounce-
ment that the defendant was responsible for the death. One very pub-
licized example of this in the 1990s was the civil action against celeb-
rity/athlete O.J. Simpson by the victims' families after he was
acquitted of double murder in the criminal trial.9"
This accountability, though expressed in terms of money, has
healing potential. The civil punishment of tortfeasors is wholly con-
sistent with the policy of deterrence behind wrongful death actions:
It is manifest that one of the primary purposes... is to deter the
kind of conduct ... which wrongfully takes life .... It is also
abundantly clear that a cause of action for wrongful death with-
out any limitation as to the amount of recoverable damages
strengthens the deterrent aspect of the civil sanction: 'the sting
of unlimited recovery ... more effectively penalize[s] the culpa-
89. Id.
90. See USA Today, O.J. Simpson civil trial index, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
index/nnsO.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
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ble defendant and deter[s] it and others similarly situated from
such future conduct.'91
But the families pay dearly for this, with attendant loss of privacy
and enduring resentment over whatever the defense said in derogation
of the injured or deceased adult child and his/her family. They are
damned if they do and damned if they don't. As one family member
put it:
I did not find the process helpful. However, to not go through
the process-would that mean I did not care about what hap-
pened? The reason I went through this was that the alternative
to not do so was to give up.92
B. Research on Parental Bereavement-Confirmation of Great Parental
Suffering When a Child is Killed at any Age
What is it about the loss of a child that makes it so deserving of
judicial resources? Although research has shown, in a general sense,
that the sudden violent death of one family member has a devastating
effect on the adjustment and function of other family members,93 rela-
tively little research about the adjustment of parents bereaved by the
death of a child had been conducted until recently.94 This inquiry
presents the most compelling reasons in favor of allowing parents to
pursue the loss of consortium for the wrongful deaths of adult chil-
dren.
A longitudinal study of parents whose twelve- to twenty-eight-
year-old children were killed by accident, homicide or suicide was be-
gun in 1992 by Professor Shirley A. Murphy of the University of
Washington." Dr. Murphy and her colleagues identified a commu-
nity-based sample of 261 parents from a search of medical examiner
files in Oregon and Washington. Participation in the study was in-
91. Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 583, 555 P.2d 997, 1002 (1976)
(citing Hurtado v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, 522 P.2d 666, 672 (1974)).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., A. Amick-McMullan, D. G. Kilpatrick, L. J. Veronen & S. Smith, Family
Survivors of Homicide Victims: Theoretical Perspectives in an Exploratory Study, 2 JOURNAL OF
TRAUMATIC STRESS 21-35 (1989); Darrin R. Lehman et al., Long-term Effects of Losing a
Spouse or Child in a Motor Vehicle Crash, 52 JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 218 (1987); J. H. Lord, Survivor Grief Following a Drunk-Driving Crash, 11
DEATH STUDIES 413 (1987).
94. See Shirley A. Murphy, The Use of Research Findings in Bereavement Programs: A Case
Study, 24 DEATH STUDIES 585 (2000).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 588.
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vited from all parents who met the selection criteria. 7 The final sam-
ple consisted of 171 mothers and 90 fathers.98 In the sample, fifty-one
percent had lost children due to accidents, twenty-three percent from
suicide and the remaining twenty-three percent from vehicular homi-
cide, murder and undetermined causes.99 The researchers then fol-
lowed this group of parents over time, with information collected
about their level of function in everyday life, as well as scores on psy-
chological tests measuring mental distress.
The results of the initial study showed that parents whose chil-
dren had been killed suffered significant levels of mental distress and
dysfunction, with a very slow reduction in this distress over time, re-
gardless of treatment modalities used.' 0 The scores of the mothers in
the group on depression, anxiety and hostility were up to five times
higher than "typical American females" the same age two years post-
death.' Fathers' scores on the same measures of mental distress were
up to four times higher than "typical American males" the same age
two years after the death. 2 Five years after the death, the mothers'
mental distress scores were still at least twice as high as the normal
population. The fathers' level of distress actually increased from what
it had been two years post-loss.0 3
Initially, about one-third of the parents met the criteria of post-
traumatic stress disorder as defined by the American Psychiatric As-
sociation in DSM-III-R. Measured two years after the deaths,
twenty-one percent of the mothers and fourteen percent of the fathers
continued to meet the clinical requirements for PTSD. °4
In summarizing her initial findings from the longitudinal data,
Dr. Murphy noted the overall severity of the symptoms suffered by
the parents, as well as their persistence:
The deterioration of fathers' health is noteworthy as are the high
rates of prescriptive medication taken by bereaved mothers.
Cognitive deficits persist as noted in parents' perceptions of
non-productivity at work. The number of parents who reported
being terminated from their jobs is alarming and demonstrates
the need for public education regarding violent death bereave-




100. Id. at 599.
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symptoms are of importance to clinicians in both family and
specialty medical practice.'0 5
Subsequent study of this same group by Dr. Murphy and her
colleagues provided further detail as to the specific forms that parents'
mental distress takes after the death of an adolescent or young adult
child." 6 Four months, on average, after the deaths of their children,
seventy-seven percent of the parents participating in the study were
asked, "Tell us about the most pressing problem you have encoun-
tered since the death of your child."'0 7 Seventy-six percent of all
comments four months post-death and fifty-two percent of all com-
ments one year after the deaths centered on an overwhelming, pro-
found sense of loss, e.g., "A parent's worst nightmare. The senseless-
ness of it all is eating me alive." . . . "Nothing matters anymore."10 8
A large number of the parents expressed anger and frustration
towards the authorities-school officials and the legal system in par-
ticular. Birthdays, holidays and the anniversaries of their childrens'
deaths caused dread and apprehension among fifty-four percent of the
parents. Considerable disruption of existing social networks was re-
ported, both at four months (thirty-eight percent) and one year (four-
teen percent) after death. 9
In summing up their findings, Dr. Murphy and her colleagues
expressed great concern for the future of these parents:
The findings have profound implications for day-to-day func-
tioning .... It is difficult to imagine experiencing trouble re-
membering things, one's mind going blank, no interest in things,
feeling hopeless about the future, and wanting to smash things,
for an extended period of time as reported in the current
study.011
In a later study, Dr. Murphy and her colleagues were able to as-
sess how the parents functioned five years after their childrens'
deaths."' A key element identified in a parent's ability to adjust after
the death of a child was to find meaning in the event, explaining the
105. Id. at 596.
106. Shirley A. Murphy et al., Changes in Parents' Mental Distress After the Violent Death of
an Adolescent or Young Adult Child: A Longitudinal Prospective Analysis, 23 DEATH STUDIES 129
(1999).
107, Id. at 148.
108. Id. at 150.
109. Id. at 151.
110. Id. at 154.
111. Shirley A. Murphy et al., Finding Meaning in a Child's Violent Death-A Five-Year
Prospective Analysis of Parents' Personal Narratives and Empirical Data, 27 DEATH STUDIES 381
(2003).
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seeming randomness or senselessness of it.' 2  The findings of this
later study demonstrate that it is a monumental struggle for parents to
find such meaning in the death of their children." 3
None of the parents in this later study reported finding meaning
in their child's death in the early bereavement period, four months
post-death." 4 This had only risen to twelve percent of parents who,
by the end of the first year, were able to view the death as anything
other than a capricious random event."' At the end of two years,
there was no improvement on this. Five years post-death, a little more
than half of the study parents (fifty-seven percent) found at least some
meaning in the death of their child, but the remaining forty-three per-
cent had not."6
Though future studies will add more fine detail to the emotional
picture of parents who have suffered the death of a child, enough of a
body of information now exists to confirm beyond any reasonable
doubt that the conventional wisdom is indeed correct, the death of a
child at any age is one of the worst things that can happen to a human
being. It fundamentally alters the parents' view of the world, social
network, employment and emotional balance. While some are able to
cope with this better than others, and women generally better than
men, the emotional pain and suffering of parents is incalculable, even
under the best of circumstances.
Yet, despite all this greater knowledge in the American family
and the parent-child relationship, the law of damages in America con-
tinues to view this relationship in terms of the long-outmoded 19th
Century analysis of children as economic units. Though part of this is
attributable to equally outmoded wrongful death legislation, judicial
rear-view mirror vision has been the driving force in perpetuating
Baker v. Bolton, piling up an enduring mountain of precedent as it ig-
nores modern social realities. Paradoxically, this rear-view mirror has
barred access to the court system for a group who is one of the most
deserving-parents whose adult children have been killed.
C. The Economic Value of Children to Aging Parents
While the value of children is no longer focused on economic
value, there is an economic aspect to the wrongful death of an adult
112. Seeid.at382.
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child that has yet to reach center stage-namely that which comes for
the loss of future caregiving potential to infirm aging parents.
In Green v. Bittner"7 the New Jersey Supreme Court was one of
the first to raise this question, though no research then existed then to
provide the answers, unlike now. The Court was confronted with a
jury verdict of no damages for the family of a high school senior who
was killed in an automobile accident. In the trial court's charge to the
jury, the scope of pecuniary loss was tightly drawn, limited to house-
hold chores." 8 The court further instructed the jury to deduct the cost
of feeding, clothing and educating the decedent child, until she
reached the age of majority, including the anticipated cost of her col-
lege education."' The applicable New Jersey wrongful death statute120
did not allow for any compensation for emotional loss accompanying
the death of a child. 121
Faced with a result in the trial court that did not conform to the
Court's view of basic justice, the Green opinion openly challenged the
idea that the loss of a child could adequately be defined by any narrow
analysis of the value of household chores. 22  Such a concept, along
with the award of no damages it produced in the trial, "would result in
117. Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 218-20 (N.J. 1980).
118. Green, 424 A.2d at 211-13.
You should consider the services that [decedent] had performed about the household
in the past, such as babysitting, cleaning and other types of home chores. In evaluat-
ing this claim, you may also consider the likelihood of any chores which... [dece-
dent] would have undertaken had she grown older about the house.
Id. at 212.
119. Id.
120. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-5 (2004).
121. Green, 424 A.2d 215-16. "Companionship and advice in this context must be limited
strictly to their pecuniary element. The command of the statute is too clear to allow compensa-
tion, directly or indirectly, for emotional loss. Our cases uniformly so hold." Id. at 215. The
Court mentioned that Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia and Washington passed statutes allowing for recovery of traditionally non-
pecuniary losses where no such legislative restrictions existed. Id. at 216 n.4. The Green opinion
foreshadowed the ultimate outcome of the case broadening the scope of pecuniary loss by noting
that even jurisdictions bound by strict pecuniary loss rules had expanded the concept of pecuni-
ary value to include "such items as comfort and companionship, or advice and counsel." Id.
122. Id. at 214-15.
[C]ontinuing family relationships- uninterrupted by the death of a family member-
encompass more than the exchange of physical chores around the house at various
times during the family's history, and even more than direct financial contribu-
tions .... Just as the law recognizes that a child may continue performing services af-
ter age 18, and that monetary contributions may also be received by the parents there-
after when the child becomes productive, it should similarly recognize that the child
may, as many do, provide valuable companionship and care as the parents get older.
Id. at 215.
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a return to the outmoded doctrine that a child is a liability-not an as-
set. "123
The New Jersey Supreme Court expanded the breadth of the pe-
cuniary loss in those circumstances, looking at the social realities of the
parent-child relationship in the latter part of the Twentieth Century
rather than blind adherence to centuries-old precedent. The Court
raised the question of the economic loss a parent suffers when a poten-
tial caregiver is taken from them. Noting that parents now live much
longer, with a consistent, dramatic increase in the longevity of the
general population, 124 the Court cited Bureau of Census Data, showing
that while the combined life expectancy for males and females in 1920
was only 54.1 years, it had increased almost 20 years to 73.2 years in
1977.12' The percentage of Americans 65 years old or greater had
gone from 9.2 percent in 1960 to a projected 12.2 percent in 1990.126
It was an understandable concern for the Court to behold the absurd
contradiction between a decreasing death rate for older Americans and
an increasing one for young people.12 7
With notable prescience, the Green court concluded that a grow-
ing population of aging parents would inevitably create a need for care
and support from their adult children.
We suspect that there are many more children aged 45 to 55
who are faced with their parents' need for care and guidance
than there were in the past.... Nursing homes are not the only
vehicle for this assistance. The parents' need is real, and when a
middle-aged son or daughter is not there because of a wrongful
death, a prospective pecuniary advantage of the aged or infirm
parent has been lost. 128
Since the time of Green, a large body of research has accumulated
on who provides the care to aging family members. Contrary to popu-
lar belief, only an estimated ten to twenty percent of family caregivers
use formal services through public or private agencies. 129 Nearly one
123. Id. at 211 (quoting Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 93 A.2d 190, 195 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1952)).
124. Id. at 219.
125. Id. at219n.11.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 219 n.12.
128. Id. at 219.
129. ELAINE M. BRODY, WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE: THEIR PARENT CARE YEARS 32
(Springer Pub. Co. 1990); Lisa P. Gwyther, Clinician and Family: A Partnership for Support, in
DEMENTIA CARE: PATIENT, FAMILY, AND COMMUNITY, 201 (Nancy L. Mace ed., Johns
Hopkins University Press 1990); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS (AARP) &
THE TRAVELERS FOUNDATION, A NATIONAL STUDY OF CAREGIVERS: FINAL REPORT
AARP, vi (1988).
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out of four households (twenty-three percent or 22.4 million house-
holds) is involved now in caregiving to persons aged fifty or over."'
25.8 million family caregivers assist adults with a disability or chronic
illness. 1 ' By the year 2007, it is projected that the number of caregiv-
ing households in the United States for persons aged fifty-five and
over could reach 39 million. 132
As suggested in Green, adult children have become a primary
source of care to aging parents. Among adults providing such services
to a family member or friend of any age, thirty-eight percent provide
care to aging parents. 33 Further, in a national sample of caregivers
who live with their care recipients, spouses account for about sixty-
two percent of the primary caregivers while adult children comprise
twenty-six percent. Secondary caregivers are more likely to be adult
children (forty-six percent) than spouses (sixteen percent).
134
Studies have demonstrated consistently that there is a consider-
able time burden on family members providing care to the aged. 131
Caregivers spend an average of 17.9 hours per week attending to re-
cipients. 13  This figure increases to twenty hours per week among
those providing care for individuals aged sixty-five or over. 13 ' 4.1 mil-
lion of individuals caring for family or friends spend over forty hours
per week doing this, with some providing constant care.' 38 The major-
ity of such caregivers provide unpaid assistance for one to four
years. 139 Twenty percent of this group provided care for five years or
longer. 4°
130. NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING AND AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
RETIRED PERSONS, FAMILY CAREGIVING IN THE U.S., FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL
SURVEY, 7-8 (June 1997).
131. Peter S. Arno et al.,The Economic Value Of Informal Caregiving, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS
182,184 (1999).
132. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FAMILY CAREGIVERS: OUR
HEROS ON THE FRONTLINES OF LONG-TERM CARE (Dec. 16, 2003), at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/Caregiver Event/factsheet.htm (last visited May 19, 2004).
133. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, INFORMAL CAREGIVING:
COMPASSION IN ACTION 6 (June 1998).
134. Family Caregiver Alliance, Fact Sheet: Selected Caregiver Statistics, at
http://www.caregiver.org/caregiver/jsp/content_node.jsp?nodeid=439 (last visited May 6,
2004).
135. See Robyn Stone et al., Caregivers Of The Frail Elderly: A National Profile, 27 THE
GERONTOLOGIST 616-26 (1987).
136. NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 130, at 16; Arno, supra note
131, at 183.
137. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FAMILY CAREGIVERS: OUR
HEROS ON THE FRONTLINES OF LONG-TERM CARE (Dec. 16, 2003), at http://aspe.hhs.gov/
daltcp/Caregiver Event/factsheet.htm.
138. See NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 130, at 16.
139. Stone et al., supra note 135, at 620, 623 tbl. 4.
140. Id.
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Contemporary research, none of which was available at the time
of the Green opinion in 1980, shows the New Jersey Supreme Court's
future vision was 20/20. For example, if the services provided by in-
formal caregivers in 1997 had to be replaced with paid services, it
would cost an estimated $196 billion.141 In 1997, $83 billion was spent
on nursing home care, along with an additional $32 billion for profes-
sionals providing home care to disabled adults.4 2 The estimated $196
billion value of informal caregiving exceeds the expenses for nursing
home care and professional home care combined by $81 billion. 43
There is a considerable cost to informal caregivers in lost wages
and benefits. Research indicates that informal caregivers lose an aver-
age of $25,494 in social security benefits, $67,202 in pension benefits
and $566,433 in wages. 144 The combined average loss of money for
informal caregivers is $659,129 per person over their lifetime.
The New Jersey Supreme Court envisioned the range of services
that adult children were likely to perform for their aging parents in
Green:
Hired companions today perform a variety of services.. . keep-
ing the [infirm adult] company and administering to basic needs.
They may prepare and serve meals, do grocery shopping, per-
form other errands, keep the home tidy, give medicines, make
telephone calls, and generally make themselves useful-
including making it possible for the [infirm adult] to be out-
doors. Care given by children to aging or infirm parents is often
indistinguishable from those services. Children also provide
many of the services ordinarily rendered by practical nurses,
such as bathing the bedridden, changing bandages, moving an
immobilized patient, administering medication, spoon-feeding
invalids, preparing special meals, keeping a sick room tidy-even removing visitors if they tire the invalid.'
While the New Jersey Supreme Court frankly acknowledged
some speculation was likely on the economic value of such support
services, it concluded that their pecuniary value had a more solid basis
in fact than the prior fiction of monetary contributions to the family
by the child. 46 In the end, the Court expressed its belief that juries
141. Arno, supra note 131, at 184-85.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, THE METLIFE JUGGLING ACT STUDY:
BALANCING CAREGIVING WITH WORK AND THE COST INVOLVED, 5-6 (Nov. 1999).
145. Green, 424 A.2d at 216 n.2.
146. Id. at 217 n.7 (citing 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS SUPP. 149
(1968)).
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would use common sense and experience to fairly determine the value
of these services."' The Court did not believe there was any more
conjecture in this calculation than any other a jury must make and dis-
carded the prior standard, which only focused on the value of house-
hold chores and direct financial contributions.148
The profound demographic shift of an aging population in
America, with more people living longer than ever before, steadily
ratchets the implications of Green to greater prominence. With the
continuing advances in health care pushing life expectancy further out
and growing questions about the ability of government programs to
cover all the needs of the elderly, the assistance of adult children is the
best, most reliable protection of our seniors. Though it was a long
time in coming, the research shows the irrefutable economic value of
adult children on this aspect. While modern children have lost any
real economic utility in their growing up years, unlike centuries ago,
the value has shifted to the other end of the spectrum, when their par-
ents are infirm and need assistance. As Green recognized, if wrongful
death actions are to be fair and just in making victims whole for their
losses, courts must consider the future economic losses of vulnerable
and aging adults.
III. THE INCOMPLETE DEVELOPMENT OF WRONGFUL
DEATH LAW FOR Loss OF ADULT CHILDREN
A. Expansion of the Common Law: Loss of Consortium
for Minor Children
There has been some creeping incremental erosion of Baker v.
Bolton in the potential damages available to parents for the loss of con-
sortium of minor children, either through injury or death.149 Initially,
this was driven by the fundamental inconsistency between allowing
damages to a child for a parent's death but, when the situation was re-
versed, denying them for a child's death. In the case of a parent's
death, the common law moved beyond the blanket prohibition of
Baker to permit damages for the loss of a parent's love and guidance,
147. Id. at 219 ("Our expectation is that verdicts will more nearly reflect the actual pecuni-
ary losses suffered").
148. Id. at 217-18. "... [W]e are not about to deny this pecuniary element of prospective
companionship and advice from a child because it may be somewhat more conjectural." Id. at
217.
149. See supra Section II, part C.
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despite the difficulty in reducing this loss to a dollar figure.' 0 Yet,
with regard to a child's death, severe limitations were placed on the
loss of consortium, limited to household chores or the probability of
future financial contributions by the child to his parent.1"'
This discrepancy in remedies was impossible to justify on any ra-
tional basis. Accordingly, the strict limitation on damages for the loss
of parental consortium for the death or injury of children finally began
to give way. The unique nature of the parent-child relationship, with
an emotional attachment of great value, was recognized as worthy of
judicial protection.5 2
In turn, the strict pecuniary approach to damages for a child's
death was increasingly seen as unduly harsh. Over four decades ago,
in Wycko v. Gnodtke53 the Michigan Supreme Court was one of the
first to come right out and declare that the era of child labor, with its
fixation on earnings and services, at an end. Though this case was
later overruled,15 4 the Michigan legislature broadened the Wrongful
Death Act to include recovery for loss of society and companionship,
as set forth in Wycko. 5
Similarly, the supreme courts of a number of other states have re-
jected a strict interpretation of pecuniary loss in the death of a minor
child.5 6 In the absence of legislation, many state courts moved to ex-
pand recovery for non-pecuniary losses. Even in jurisdictions where
strict pecuniary loss rules existed, the pecuniary value of items such as
comfort, companionship, and advice were permitted, expanding the
remedy to the death of adult children."5 7
B. Frank v. Superior Court of Arizona: Expansion of the Parental
Right for Loss of Consortium to Adult Children
Decided in 1985, Frank v. Superior Court of Arizona is the first
case to conduct a damages analysis that fully realizes the modern par-
ent-child relationship, expanding the loss of consortium to adult chil-
dren."58 The Arizona State Supreme Court dramatically abandoned
150. See, e.g., Suarez v. Berg, 285 A.2d 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1971); Solomon v.
Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (Sth Cir. 1976); Tolley v. Engert, 235 P. 652 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1925);
Frasier v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 244 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1957).
151. See, e.g., Grafv. Taggert, 204 A.2d 140, 143-45 (N.J. 1964).
152. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
153. 105 N.W.2d 118 (Mich. 1960).
154. See Beckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 174 N.W.2d 836, 836-40 (Mich. 1970).
155. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (2003).
156. See Selders v. Armentrout, 207 N.W.2d 686 (Neb. 1983); Fussner v. Andert, 113
N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1961).
157. See Green, 424 A.2d at 216 n. 4; see also supra notes 121-22.
158. Frank, 722 P.2d 955.
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the traditional rear-view mirror of the common law and boldly looked
out the windshield, realistically describing what social conditions actu-
ally existed. The Court held that the parents of an adult child who
was severely injured during the negligent administration of anesthesia
during surgery were entitled to maintain a cause of action for loss of
consortium against a third party."9 By this point, Arizona already was
one of thirty-five states that had effectively overruled Baker, allowing
recovery for the loss of companionship and society for wrongful
death.16 Since 1965, such wrongful death actions in Arizona were no
longer strictly limited to pecuniary damages, but also included loss of
companionship, comfort and guidance.161
Drawing upon the recent lower court decision in Reben v. Ely'62
that recognized for the first time that a cause of action existed for the
loss of consortium of a minor child, the Court in Frank found that
"[n]o meaningful distinction can be drawn between death and severe
injury when the effect on consortium is concerned."' 63
Frank soundly rejected the argument that emancipation frees
parents and children from the reciprocal legal obligations of support
and obedience, noting that the argument was premised upon "an ar-
chaic and outmoded pecuniary theory of parental rights and funda-
mentally misapprehends the modern elements of consortium."' 64 The
Court then traced the roots of the loss of consortium action through
the common law, from principles of master and servant to the modern
conception of the parent-child relationship:
At its earliest stage, then, the action for loss of consortium was
in fact an action for loss of services to which the master was enti-
tled. Gradually, however, services became only one element of
the action as the intangible elements of love, comfort and society
emerged as the predominant focus of consortium actions. 65
Frank directly attacked the pecuniary value origin of loss of con-
sortium in the common law:
It is irrelevant that parents are not entitled to the services of
their adult children; they continue to enjoy a legitimate and pro-
tectable expectation of consortium beyond majority arising from
the very bonds of the family relationship. Surely nature recoils
159. Frank, 722 P.2d at 961.
160. Id. at 957 n.5 (citing Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983)).
161. See Boies v. Cole, 407 P.2d 917, 920 (Ariz. 1965); State v. Watson, 436 P.2d 175, 181
(Ariz. Ct. App.1968).
162. 705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
163. Frank, 722 P.2d at 957.
164. Id. at 958.
165. Id. at 958-59.
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from the suggestion that the society, companionship and love
which compose filial consortium automatically fade upon eman-
cipation .... The filial relationship, admittedly intangible, is
ill-defined by reference to the ages of parties and ill-served by
arbitrary age distinctions. 166
In the end, Frank rejected drawing any arbitrary line when a par-
ent should expect that the value of their adult child's companionship
should be at an end:
We can find no reason for limiting the class of plaintiffs to par-
ents of minor children when the parents of adult children may
suffer equal or greater harm. Why should the parents of an in-
jured seventeen-year-old be allowed to recover for the loss of
consortium, but not the parents of an injured eighteen-year-old?
We can divine no adequate answer based on law or logic.'67
Taking a new broom firmly in hand, Frank swept all the remain-
ing 177-year-old cobwebs of Baker away from Arizona common law.
Without the baggage of the weight of unsound precedent to carry,
Frank was able to achieve a clear thinking analysis of what parents and
children actually mean to one another, at any age. It is only under
these circumstances that the true remedial purposes of the law can be
realized:
... doing all the things that constitute modern living-there
must of necessity be losses, or injuries of many kinds sustained
as a result of the activities of others. The purpose of the law of
torts is to adjust these losses and to afford compensation for in-
juries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of an-
other. 6
C. Lack of Response to Frank
Despite the well-reasoned analysis of Frank, the continuing force
of the rear-view mirror perspective of the judiciary is not to be under-
estimated. The response to the Arizona State Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Frank has been underwhelming. In Tynan v. Curzi, the Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division outright rejected the
Frank analysis finding continued vitality in limiting recovery to the
parents for loss of the consortium of minor children, categorizing it as"a rational response":
166. Id. at 960.
167. Id. at 961.
168. Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 238 (1944)
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As compared to adult children, minors are significantly less
likely to have spouses or children of their own.... In addition,
the period of minority itself is limited .... Today, with increas-
ing life expectancy, it is not uncommon that persons sixty or
even seventy years of age may still have surviving parents. Ex-
tending the parents' cause of action to their adult children,
therefore, will in many cases extend the parents' potential period
of recovery by as much as forty or fifty years.169
While aware of the poignant circumstances in the facts of Tynan,
in which plaintiffs nineteen-year-old daughter was severely injured in
an automobile accident, the New Jersey Appellate Court deferred,
stating that "[t]o do otherwise would establish a new cause of action
beyond that which has been the common law of this state. '"170
The Washington State Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Philippides v. Bernard171 was virtually identical to Tynan. Based on a
comparatively recent amendment to the Washington wrongful death
statute,172 the trial court had allowed the parents of a twenty-two-year-
old bike messenger who was run down and killed by a speeding mo-
torist in a Seattle crosswalk to sue for loss of consortium. The statu-
tory phrase "dependent for support" was held by the trial judge to in-
clude the emotional and psychological support of adult children to
their parents. 173 The defendants appealed a jury award of $900,000 to
each of the decedent's parents for loss of consortium.
The Philippides majority rejected both the statutory and common
law arguments presented in support of allowing the loss of consortium
for the death of adult children, finding the following:
The legislature has identified the statutory beneficiaries. While
we may agree that the value parents place on children in our so-
ciety is no longer associated with the child's ability to provide
income to the parents, the legislature has defined who can sue
for the wrongful death and injury of a child and we cannot alter
the legislative directive.'74
While fully cognizant of the Frank decision, which was discussed
at length, the majority in Philippides refused to recognize that there
had ever been an independent common law right to recover the
169. Tynan v. Curzi, 753 A.2d 187, 190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
170. Id. at 192.
171. Philippides v. Bernard, Nos. 73239-6, 73603-1, 73736-3, 74098-4, 2004 WL 855449
(Wash. Apr. 22, 2004).
172. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (2004).
173. Philippides, 2004 WL 855449, at "1.
174. Id. at*6.
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wrongful death, in effect perpetuating the unfortunate legacy of Bakerv. Bolton."'s
However, in an unmistakable step of forward progress, the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii directly adopted Frank in Masaki v. General
Motors Corp.,176 a case in which a twenty-eight-year-old auto me-
chanic was rendered quadriplegic as the result of an alleged product
defect.177  The Hawaii court rejected the narrow economic analysis
that valued children only by their services and earnings, finding such
reasoning outmoded and illogical:
In the modem family, however, children have become less of an
economic asset and more of a financial burden to their parents.
Today children are valued for their society and companion-
ship. 178
The ease with which Masaki embraced this concept has not yet
been shared by other courts. Frank stands out as a lonely beacon of
truth in an otherwise bleak legal landscape.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts confronted with fashioning civil remedies for aggrieved
parents in future tort cases must make better use of the available clini-
cal and behavioral research. Clearly, the modern conception of the
parent-child relationship has moved far beyond the 17th Century no-
tion of a child as a property right. As stated by the Supreme Court of
Ohio in Gallimore v. Children's Hospital Medical Center, "[t]he parent-
child relationship is unique, and it is particularly deserving of special
recognition in the law.' 179
After centuries of adhering to the outmoded view of children as
economic units, only a few courts have invoked strongly the modern
day view of children's value in love and companionship."' 0 If our civil
175. Philippides relied on the Washington Court of Appeals decision of Tait v. Wahl, 97
Wash. App. 765, 771, 987 P.2d 127 (1999), quoting, "Courts of this state have long and repeat-
edly held, causes of action for wrongful death are strictly a matter of legislative grace and are not
recognized in the common law." Though not mentioned by name, Tait v. Wahl was heavily in-
fluenced by the spirit of Baker v. Bolton as the opinion stated, without analysis, "[i]t is settled
beyond controversy that, at common law, no civil action could be maintained for damages result-
ing from the death of a human being." 97 Wash. App. at 771.
176. 780 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1989).
177. Id. at 569.
178. Id at 577.
179. 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1058 (Ohio 1983).
180. The most notable examples are the Arizona State Supreme Court's opinion in Frank v.
Super. Ct. of Ariz., 722 P.2d 955 (Ariz. 1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Bitt-
ner v. Green, 424 A.2d 210 (N.J. 1980), and the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Gallimore v.
Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1983). The Ohio State Supreme Court
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justice system is to have integrity, it should provide a remedy for those
classes of persons who have suffered the most grievous kind of inju-
ries, physical or emotional, because of the carelessness of others.
Clinical research now conclusively establishes that it makes no differ-
ence to the parents of a child who has been badly injured or killed
whether or not that child was below or above the age of majority. The
severe injury or death of a child at any age causes unimaginable, per-
sistent suffering to the surviving parents. Even from a purely eco-
nomic analysis, research now also shows that the serious injury to or
loss of adult children causes substantial pecuniary loss, given the criti-
cal role they often play in providing care to aging, infirm parents.
Beyond the lingering pernicious effects of Baker v. Bolton, an
economic argument has been made that permitting the parents of
adult children to bring a claim for loss of consortium for the serious
injury to or death of their adult child will "open the floodgates" for
claims. This was raised in Frank v. Superior Court of Arizona, where
the Arizona State Supreme Court dismissed it out of hand; comment-
ing that "such fears have been likened to 'the fabled cry of wolf, and
have often proven groundless." '181
A search of reported Arizona jury verdicts and settlements over
the ten-year period following the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in
Frank reveals very few reported cases for the loss of parental consor-
tium involving adult children."' Of these relative few, all involved se-
boldly stuck out its judicial chin and dared "those who take umbrage" to take a critical swing at
them when it held that a mother could bring a suit individually for loss of consortium of her mi-
nor son for injuries he sustained as a result of a hospital's alleged malpractice. Gallimore, 617
N.E.2d at 1060.
Our critics may wish to perpetuate and anachronistic and sterile view of the relation-
ship between parents and children, but we seek to distance ourselves from that view-
point. Either the common law must be modernized to conform with present-day
norms, or it will engender a lack of respect as being out of touch with the realities of
our time.
Id. See also, similar language used by the Arizona State Supreme Court in extending the parental
right to a loss of consortium action to adult children in Frank, 722 P.2d at 958 (stating "[W]e
believe that this argument against extension of a filial consortium action to adults is premised
upon an archaic and outmoded pecuniary theory of parental rights and fundamentally misappre-
hends the modern elements of consortium.")
181. Frank, 722 P.2d at 960 (citing Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus
on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 817 (1985)).
182. The Trial Reporter of Arizona found only 11 total verdicts and settlements for paren-
tal loss of consortium of their adult children who had been seriously injured, but not killed.
Eight out of the eleven cases involved adult children who were 21 years of age or younger and
needed continuing parental assistance as a consequence of their injuries. See infra Table B. Let-
ter from James Leonard, Jr., plaintiff's attorney in Frank v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 722 P.2d 955
(Ariz. 1986) to Author (Mar. 19 2003) (stating that "My personal belief is that the change in
Arizona personal injury practice has not been tremendous [following Frank] .... I would be
tremendously surprised if there have been more than 20 such verdicts or substantial portions of
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vere injuries. However, given the concurrent demographic trends of
an aging population and an epidemic of violent deaths of young people
in America, if the parents of adult children are allowed to pursue ac-
tions for loss of consortium for wrongful death or serious injury, it is
likely that this remedy will be put to greater use. And the facts of the
reported Arizona cases show that these actions are far from frivolous.
If a claim is just, it ought to be heard, regardless of how many others
like it exist.
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall deprive any person of the equal protection
of its laws.'83 Unless it employs a suspect classification or burdens a
fundamental right, wrongful death statutes are subject to the minimal
scrutiny or "rational basis" test. 84 Statutes involving the beneficiaries
of wrongful death actions do not involve a suspect classification or
fundamental right.'85 Under the rational basis test, a legislative classi-
fication will be upheld unless it:
Rests on grounds wholly relevant to the achievement of the
State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in prac-
tice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimi-
nation will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it.186
In light of the now proven lifelong bonds of affection and society
that exist between parent and child, 87 is there any rational basis for
distinguishing between a parent's loss of a minor as compared to an
adult child? How can the parents of a minor child recover for loss of
consortium and other economic damages, but not the parents of an
adult child? If children are no longer viewed as merely chattel, under
the now outmoded view of the parent-child relationship, there is no
difference. There may have been a rational basis in the 19th and early
2oth centuries, when children were expected to contribute to the fam-
ily income while still in their minority. By modern standards, how-
ever, that is no longer true.
settlements .... I have remained active---entering my 38th year of practice-and I feel if there
had been any substantial number of such claims I would be aware of them.") (on file with au-
thor).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
184. See, e.g., Myrick v. Bd. of Pierce County Comm'rs, 102 Wash.2d 698, 701, 677 P.2d
140 (1984) modified by 687 P.2d 1152 (1984).
185. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1979).
186. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961).
187. See supra Section II, parts A, B.
Seattle University Law Review
In Masunaga v. Gapasint8" the Washington Court of Appeals
considered an equal protection challenge made by the parents of an
adult child who was struck and killed by a motorist. The Court re-
jected the equal protection analysis, holding that the state law restrict-
ing the cause of action to those financially dependent on the decedent
was sufficient to pass scrutiny under the rational basis test. 89 In the
end, the Washington court found a "consistent judicial reluctance to
tamper with the legislative choice of beneficiaries for wrongful death
actions.""19 The Washington Court of Appeals decision in Masunaga
is strikingly similar to the older and increasingly outmoded approach
of looking only at the legal technicalities, not at the flesh and blood re-
lationship that exists between parent and child. The question remains
how long this kind of analysis will remain viable in the face of increas-
ing research in the social sciences on just how important the parent-
child relationship is.
The acknowledged mandate of the common law to incorporate
the evolving enlightened views of our society is at fundamental odds
with the rear-view mirror approach it has taken. Parents have never
received proper consideration in seeking redress for the serious injury
to or the wrongful death of their adult children, and basic notions of
justice require that these parents be allowed to seek redress for one of
the most painful losses that a human being can ever suffer. We have
marched backwards into the future far too long.
188. 57 Wash. App. 624, 790 P.2d 171 (1990).
189. Masunaga, 57 Wash. App. at 634; 790 P.2d at 176 (stating "The mere fact that a
statutory classification does not provide a remedy for every conceivable type of injury does not
render the statute irrational or unconstitutional."). The court also concluded that "numerous
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TABLE A
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, AT AGE 65 YEARS OF AGE, AND AT 75
YEARS OF AGE, ACCORDING TO RACE AND SEX: UNITED STATES,
SELECTED YEARS 1900-2001."l
(Data is based on death certificates)
ALL RACES
Both
Specified age and year Sexes Male Female
At birth
Remaining life expectancy in years
1900 ............... 47.3 46.3 48.3
1950 ............... 68.2 65.6 71.1
1960 ............... 69.7 66.6 73.1
1970 ............... 70.8 67.1 74.7
1980 ............... 73.7 70.0 77.4
1985 ............... 74.7 71.1 78.2
1990 ............... 75.4 71.8 78.8
1991 ............... 75.5 72.0 78.9
1992 ............... 75.8 72.3 79.1
1993 ............... 75.5 72.2 78.8
1994 ............... 75.7 72.4 79.0
1995 ............... 75.8 72.5 78.9
1996 ............... 76.1 73.1 79.1
1997 ............... 76.5 73.6 79.4
1998 ............... 76.7 73.8 79.5
1999 ............... 76.7 73.9 79.4
2000 ............... 77.0 74.3 79.7
2001 ............... 77.2 74.4 79.8
191. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, AT
65 YEARS OF AGE, AND AT 75 YEARS OF AGE, ACCORDING TO RACE AND SEX: UNITED
STATES, SELECTED YEARS 1900-2001, available at http://www.cdec.gov/nchs/data/hus/
tables/2003/03 hus027.pdf (last visited May 11, 2004).
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Both
Specified age and year Sexes Male Female
At 65 years
1950 ............... 13.9 12.8 15.0
1960 ............... 14.3 12.8 15.8
1970 ............... 15.2 13.1 17.0
1980 ............... 16.4 14.1 18.3
1985 ............... 16.7 14.5 18.5
1990 ............... 17.2 15.1 18.9
1991 ............... 17.4 15.3 19.1
1992 ............... 17.5 15.4 19.2
1993 ............... 17.3 15.3 18.9
1994 ............... 17.4 15.5 19.0
1995 ............... 17.4 15.6 18.9
1996 ............... 17.5 15.7 19.0
1997 ............... 17.7 15.9 19.2
1998 ............... 17.8 16.0 19.2
1999 ............... 17.7 16.1 19.1
2000 ............... 18.0 16.2 19.3
2001 ............... 18.1 16.4 19.4
Both
Specified age and year Sexes Male Female
At 75 years
1980 ............... 10.4 8.8 11.5
1985 ............... 10.6 9.0 11.7
1990 ............... 10.9 9.4 12.0
1991 ............... 11.1 9.5 12.1
1992 ............... 11.2 9.6 12.2
1993 ............... 10.9 9.5 11.9
1994 ............... 11.0 9.6 12.0
1995 ............... 11.0 9.7 11.9
1996 ............... 11.1 9.8 12.0
1997 ............... 11.2 9.9 12.1
1998 ............... 11.3 10.0 12.2
1999 ............... 11.2 10.0 12.1
2000 ............... 11.4 10.1 12.3
2001 ............... 11.5 10.2 12.4
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TABLE B
REPORTED ARIZONA VERDICTS & SETTLEMENTS SINCE FRANK
DECISION-PARENTAL LOSS OF CONSORTIUM OF ADULT
CHILD192
DATE CASE CASE AGE OF TYPE OF INJURY AMOUNT
NUMBER NAME ADULT AWARD OF
CHILD AWARD
9/23/86 549551 Dettmann v. 38 Settlement Head Injury $50,000 for
Atco each parent
2/5/90 UlM Brown v. 20 Arbitration Head Injury Total of
Arbitration State Farm $100,000
for both
parents
6/11/90 87-1511 Molinar- Early Settlement Head Injury $5,000 for
Duarte v. 20's each parent
Dallas Corp.




12/4/90 88-17396 Barzano v. 18 Verdict Amputation $25,000 for
State of Ari- of Toes mother, re-
zona duced to
$14,500
2/21/92 272492 Murphy v. 18 Settlement Head injury, $300,000 to
Sears, Roe- orthopedic mother
buck & Co. injuries
5/16/97 300722 Greismer v. 21 Verdict Massive brain $250,000 to
Nissan Mo- damage mother, re-
tor Corp. duced to
$20,000
5/18/99 98-09505 Mains v. 46 Settlement Multiple or- Total of
State of Ari- thopedic $20,000 to
zona parents
10/22/99 96-02751 Candello v. 19 Verdict Quadriplegic $510,000
Fuji Heavy for each
Industries, parent
Ltd.




192. Data gathered by the Trial Reporter of Arizona, P.O. Box 8187, Phoenix, AZ 85066-
8187 at the request of the author (on file with Author). No verdicts or settlements have been
reported in Arizona for the loss of parental consortium due to the death of an adult child. While
anecdotal evidence suggests that such cases have been brought and settled, for unknown reasons,
they have not been reported formally.
